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Abstract 
The Bangladesh securities market, despite ifs operation of half of a century, remains in embryonic form. 
The market has been suffering from a chronic lack of investor confidence since 1997 following an 
unprecedented share scam. Ever since, the government has been striving in vain to promote investment 
by progressively offering incentives to investors and corporations. The government watchdog 
unexpectedly introduced the Disclosure-Based Regulation (DBR) in January 1999 to protect investors 
from the misfeasance of other players in the market for Initial Public Offerings. Recent studies have 
identified some problems in the market, which are unfavourable for the new regime. In such a situation, 
the governmental incentives to induce market participants and adopting the DBR to restore public 
confidence in the moribund securities market appear to be like using "ointment on an infection which 
urgently needs antibiotic injections". This article intends to argue upon critical analysis of the regime that 
importing the disclosure philosophy from the developed markets without attaining the pre-requisites for 
its usefulness is an arrangement like 'puffing the cart before the horse". 
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A d o p t io n  o f  t h e  
D is c l o s u r e -B a s e d  
R e g u l a t io n  f o r  I n v e s t o r  
P r o t e c t io n  in  t h e  P r im a r y  
S h a r e  M a r k e t  in  
B a n g l a d e s h : P u t t in g  t h e  
C a r t  B e f o r e  t h e  H o r s e ?
S  M  S o  LAI MAN"
[The Bangladesh securities market, despite its operation o f  ha lf o f  a cen­
tury, remains in embryonic form . The market has been suffering from  a 
chronic lack o f  investor confidence since 1997following an unprecedented 
share scam. Ever since, the government has been striving in vain to pro­
mote investment by progressively offering incentives to investors and cor­
porations. The government watchdog unexpectedly introduced the 
Disclosure-Based Regulation (DBR) in January 1999 to protect investors 
from  the misfeasance o f  other players in the market fo r  Initial Public Of­
ferings. Recent studies have identified some problems in the market, which 
are unfavourable fo r  the new regime. In such a situation, the governmental 
incentives to induce market participants and adopting the DBR to restore 
public confidence in the moribund securities market appear to be like us­
ing "ointment on an infection which urgently needs antibiotic injections 
This article intends to argue upon critical analysis o f  the regime that im­
porting the disclosure philosophy from  the developed markets without at­
taining the pre-requisites fo r  its usefulness is an arrangement like "putting 
the cart before the horse".]
Lecturer, Faculty o f  Law, University o f  Wollongong, Australia.
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I I n t r o d u c t io n
A vibrant capital market helps ensure the efficient and sustainable funding of gov­
ernment initiatives, corporations, large-scale or long-term development projects. 
Unlike the case in developed economies, investment games in stock markets in the 
third world involve two major unequal players -  fund seeker corporate entities and 
fund provider unsophisticated small savers. A recognized informational asymmetry 
exists between them and hence the market is an uneven playing filed. The disclo­
sure o f  information affecting investment decisions in a prospectus aims to facilitate 
informed investment decisions by minimizing this information gap. The securities 
regulator in Bangladesh in January 1999 adopted the Disclosure-Based Regulation 
(DBR), a regulatory regime useful for the developed securities markets, for an 
embryonic capital market by discarding the previous merit regime without any 
study being conducted on the market readiness to utilize the new philosophy. De­
spite this significant reform in regulatory philosophy and offering of some incen­
tives (eg, tax benefits) to both companies and investors, the market fails to restore 
public confidence which is evident from its continuous poor performance over the 
years. There have been widespread allegations o f corporate misfeasance in raising 
funds from the primary market. Recently the Dhaka Stock Exchange, the prime 
bourse of the country, has discovered that a total o f 19 companies out of 52 floated 
so far since the introduction of the DBR have ‘easily exploited general shareholders 
through IPOs and thus eroded the confidence o f the investors significantly’.1 The 
chairman o f the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took pride in introduc­
ing the DBR.2 But the market, in the meantime, proved the decision to be wrong 
and premature. O f late, the stock exchanges have identified the DBR as one o f  the 
major impediments to the revitalisation of the securities market.3 This paper intends 
to investigate the applicability of the DBR to the primary share market in Bangla­
desh by reference to some selected aspects. It also provides a brief account o f 
origins o f  the DBR. The conclusions present that the DBR is inapplicable to this 
market mainly because o f  the paucity o f  sophisticated investors, almost non­
existence o f corporate governance and a profound lack o f full and fair disclosure of 
material information in prospectuses. The discussions concentrate on some selected 
aspects o f  market readiness for the application o f the DBR.
1 A D B's Capital M arket Dev Project "Little Productive, T h e  N ew  A g e , Dhaka (1 Jun 2004).
1 S e c u r it ie s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  C om m ission  (SEC), D h a k a , a n n u a l  R e p o r t  1 9 9 8 -1999 , at 58.
5 AIMS, iVaning Indices in Ike Bourses, WEEKLY MARKET REVIEW (15 Mar 2003) at I .
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II M e th o d s  o f  P r o v id in g  I n v e s t o r  
P r o t e c t i o n  in IPO M a r k e t s
The expression ‘investor protection’ in this paper refers to saving investors from 
being misled, defrauded or deceived by defective prospectuses which are prepared 
by promoters and directors in collaboration with their intermediaries and market 
professionals. This can be achieved by preventing the members o f IPO coalitions 
(persons involved in an IPO ranging from promoters to professionals) from expro­
priating resources from investors. If any wrong occurs, investors should be ade­
quately compensated and offenders should be brought to justice.
Effective regulation is considered to be the most useful mechanism o f investor 
protection.4 Since the inception o f securities regulation, various philosophies, 
methods or systems o f regulation have emerged to regulate IPO markets. A single 
system o f regulation is not suitable for all. A country should choose a particular 
philosophy depending on the characteristics o f its financial market.5 The major 
systems o f IPO regulation are the Merit-Based Regulation (MBR), the DBR and the 
Hybrid o f the two (MBR and the DBR). The basic functions of regulation are two­
fold. First, it prohibits frauds, and secondly, it requires companies to disclose in­
formation necessary to make informed investment decisions both at the time o f the 
issuance o f  securities and periodically thereafter.6
This view is commonly reflected in works in which investor protection has been emphasised For the 
development o f  securities markets: See R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes & A Shleifer, What 
Works in Securities Law, available at:
<http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers.html> (2 Dec 2002) ; R La Porta, F 
Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer & R Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57  
JOURNAL OF fin a n c e  1147 (2002); A Shleifer & D Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity 
Markets, 66 Jo u r n a l  of Financial  Eco no m ics  3 (2002); F Lopez-De-Silanes, The Politics o f  
Legal Reforms, 2 Economic 91 (2002); R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer & R Vishny, 
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 3 
(2000); R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer & R W Vishny, Agency Problems and Divi­
dend Policies Around the World, 55 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1 (2000); R La Porta, F Lopez-De- 
Silanes, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 471 (1999); R La 
Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer, Law and Finance, 106 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
1113 (1 998); R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer & R W Vishny, Legal Determinants o f  
External Finance, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1131 (1997); A Shleifer & R W Vishny, A Survey o f  
Corporate Governance, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 737 (1997).
However, there have been some academic scholars who oppose securities market regulation: see  G 
J Stigler, Public Regulation o f  the Securities Markets, 37 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 117 (1964). For 
reply to Stigler’s observations, see  1 Friend &  E S Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 
37 Jo u r n a l  OF B u sin e ss  382 (1964); S Robbins & W Werner, ‘Professor Stigler Revisited’, 37 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 406 (1964). Stigler responded to his criticism, see  G J Stigler, 'C om ­
ments’, 7 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 414 (1964). Nonetheless, the idea is still limited to mere aca­
demic debate. This is because, to the best o f  the present w riter’s knowledge, securities markets 
worldwide are regulated in one form or another with the primary objective o f  investor protection.
T H MclNfSH, C a p it a l  M a r k e ts -A  G l o b a l  P e r s p e c t iv e  155 (2000).
F H Easterbrook &  D R Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection o f  Investors, in 
Fo u n d a t io n s  o f  CORPORATE Law  303  (Roberta Romano, ed,,l 993).
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A Merit-Based Regulation
The MBR originated in the US through the blue sky laws in the early 20* century.7 
The central concept o f the MBR is that the regulator will consent to only those 
proposed public offers which arc considered to be worthy of investment. The regu­
lator assesses the merits o f a proposed offer before consenting or refusing to con­
sent to it. The MBR thus represents a paternalistic approach, because the regulator 
carries out the merit assessment on behalf o f investors.
The theoretical basis o f  the merit regulation is that ‘[bjecause of the nature of 
securities, a buyer cannot make an immediate value judgment, as he [or she] would 
with tangible items’.8 The MBR is based on a philosophy which presupposes that 
ordinary investors are not able to make prudent investment decisions even though 
companies disclose all ‘material information’9 in relation to the issuers and their 
issues. It is also considered that issuers are in a better position than investors in 
respect o f the knowledge of economic fundamentals and the potential o f  the busi­
ness of the issuer and investment wisdom as a whole. Viewed from this perspective, 
the regulator assesses the merits o f  proposed offers and consents only to those 
offers which are considered to be ‘fair, just, and equitable’.10 In this way, the MBR 
protects potential investors from ‘unfair’ offers and maintains market integrity for 
‘fair’ ones.11 It is widely believed that the MBR is the best system for emerging 
markets where the market is dominated by unsophisticated retail investors.12 As per 
the assessment o f the International Organization o f  Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the MBR is a preferable system for developing markets especially those 
markets which lack professional analysts and advisers.13 It is noteworthy that there 
have been significant volumes o f literature concerning the debate on merits and 
demerits o f  both the MBR and the DBR.14 The Bangladesh securities market is still
L Loss, T r e n d s  in  C o r p o r a te  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  I n v e s to r  P r o t e c t io n  36 (1981). Loss 
mentioned the M BR as ‘hom egrown regulatory or merit philosophy'.
R L Knauss, A Reappraisal o f  the Role o f  Disclosure, 62 M ich. L. Rev. 607, 6 10 (1964).
The term “material information" will be discussed in section 3.4.
LOSS, su pra  note 7.
From the regulatory point o f view, a public offer is considered to be “ fair" if  it is assessed by the 
regulator as beneficial for the investing public.
C K Low, Revisiting the Regulatory Framework o f  Capital Markets in M alaysia, 14 Coturn. J. 
Asian L, 277, 287 fn 22 (2001). For details o f  the MBR at a  suitable length, see  P A Wellons, 
‘Prototypes o f  Securities Regulation for Africa: Key Issues’, Harvard Law School, CAER II Dis­
cussion Paper No. 47 (CD-ROM) (2000) at 17-23.
Issuers, M arket Intermediaries, and Secondary M arkets in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF 
S ecurities Co m m issio ns  (IOSCO), O bjectives a n d  principles  o f  S ecurities  Reg u l a t io n : 
a  repo r t  of th e  in tern atio na l  O r g a n isa tio n  of Secu rities  C o m m issio n  (Sep 1998) at 14. 
Available at:
< http://www.iosco.org/doc-public/1998-objectives-docum entO I.hm tl>  (2 Jul 1999).
The debate originated following the adoption o f  the DBR at the federal level in 1933 in the US, 
whilst state level securities regulation relied on the merit philosophy. For details o f  the debate, see 
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation o f  the State Regulation o f  Securities Committee, ‘Re­
port on State Merit Regulation o f  Securities Offerings’, 41 Bus. Law . 785 (1986); J S Mofsky,
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pre-emerging and it is overwhelmingly dominated by retailers who seriously lack 
investment knowledge and who are unsophisticated in the true sense.15 The market 
followed the MBR till the end of 1998, before the adoption o f the DBR.
B Disclosure-Based Regulation
In contrast to the MBR, the DBR relies on making ‘full and fair disclosure’ to the 
public. The DBR differs fundamentally from the MBR in that it requires that any 
company may be allowed to go public if  it discloses all material information neces­
sary to make informed investment decisions in its prospectus. This regime relies 
entirely on compliance with the disclosure requirements instead of fulfilling any 
threshold ‘qualifications’ as envisaged in the merit regime. The regulator does not 
assess the merit o f the public offer; rather it leaves the onus o f  the assessment to 
potential investors themselves. In the DBR, the regulator is thus least concerned 
with the merit of public offers. The regulator, in fact, does not take any responsibil­
‘State Securities Regulation and New Promotions: A Case History’, 15 Wa y n e  L. Re v . 1401 
(1969); J S M o fsk y , B lue Sk y  Restrictions o n  n e w  Bu sin ess  Pro m o tio ns (1971); 
Matth ew  b e n d e r  & H K ripke, d isc l o su r e : Reg u l a tio n  in  Search  o f  a  P u rp o se  (1979); H
S Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory o f  Overkill, 15 W a y n e  L. REV. 1447 (1969(; 
E W W alker & B B Hadaway, M erit Standard Revisited: An Empirical Analysis o f  the Efficiency 
o f  Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L 651 (1982); M A Sargent, Blue Sky Law: The Challenge 
to M erit Regulation-Part /, 12 Securities Reg ulatio n  L.J. 276 (1984); M A Sargent, Blue Sky  
Law: The Challenge to Merit Regulation-Part II, 12 SECURITIES REGULATION L. J. 367 (1985); C 
G Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There M erit in the M erit Requirements?, WlS. L. REV. 79, 81 
(1976); H M Makens, Who Speaks fo r  the Investors? An Evaluation o f  the Assault on M erit Regu­
lation, 13 U. B alt . L. Re v . 4 3 5 (1 9 8 4 );M H  Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 H ARV. 
L. REV. 1340, 1351-52 (1966); J T Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey  
o f  Comments and a  Ranking o f  States by  Stringency o f  Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689 (1985); J T 
Brandi, Merit Securities Regulation, M arket Efficiency, and New Issue Stock Performance, 12 J. 
CORP. L. 699 (1987), Knauss, supra note 8.
Based on the state o f  development (in terms o f  per capita Gross National Income as well as the 
market performance) securities markets worldwide have been broadly divided into two categories, 
namely, developed and emerging markets. The markets in the countries which have achieved the 
high per capita Gross National Income fixed by the World Bank are designated as developed mar­
kets and the remaining markets are said to be emerging ones. For details o f  the market classifica­
tion, see  Standard Sl Poor’s, Emerging Stock M arkets Factbook 2002 (2002) New York: Standard 
and Poor's at 30 &  352. The market in Bangladesh falls under the broad category o f  emerging 
markets. However, there have been significant differences amongst the emerging markets in terms 
o f their achievements and performance. In view o f  these differences, a new division was intro­
duced in September 1996 and currently, a total o f  20 o f  the emerging markets as covered by the 
Standard and Poor’s have been identified as "frontier markets” . The frontier markets are those 
which are "relatively small and illiquid even by emerging market standards": Standard & Poor's, 
‘S & P Frontier Index Series’, available at:
<http://www2.standardandpoors.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer7pagename~sp/Page/lndiccslnde
xPg& r=l& b=4& s=6& ig-44& l=EN& i=64& xcd=FRONT> (19 Jun 2003). The Bangladesh market 
has been placed in the frontier market category: Standard & Poor’s, Emerging Stock M arkets 
Factbook 2002 (2002) New York: Standard and Poor’s at 33 & Standard & Poor's (Apr 2002) 
Emerging Slock M arkets Review  at 218. Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) designated the stock markets o f  least developed countries ‘pre­
emerging m arket’: UNCTAD, Investing in Pre-Emerging M arkets: Opportunities fo r  Investment 
o f  R isk Capital in die LDCs (1998) New York: United Nations. Accordingly, the UNCTAD in­
cluded the Bangladesh market as pre-emerging one.
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ity with respect to the merits o f an offer and such a disclaimer shall be published 
‘bold type face’ (upper case) in the prospectus.16
As regards the theoretical basis for the DBR, the disclosure philosophy is that, once 
the facts about the issue and the issuer are made public properly, investors have no 
one but themselves to blame for their investment decisions. The sole responsibility 
o f the regulator is ‘to ensure the full and fair disclosure’ in the prospectus in order 
to enable investors to make informed investment judgments.17 This is consistent 
with the prime objective o f corporate disclosures which allow investors to make 
‘informed, rational investment decisions as to the best estimate o f the price of the 
securities’.18
The IOSCO considers that the DBR is beneficial for developed markets.19 However, 
the securities regulator in Bangladesh adopted the DBR in January 1999 for a 
frontier or pre-emerging market.
C Hybrid of the MBR and DBR
A hybrid system o f regulation combines the characteristics o f  the above two sys­
tems, the MBR and the DBR, This system may be applied by allowing some relaxa­
tion in the merit requirements and exempting some selected public offers from the 
regulatory merit review. A securities regulator may adopt this hybrid approach as 
an interim arrangement during the shift from the MBR to the DBR. Malaysia, for 
example, adopted this system for the period o f  its transition from the MBR to the 
DBR during the period between 1996-2002.10
Ill  T h e  D B R  a n d  t h e  R e a l i t y  in t h e  
B a n g la d e s h  IPO M a r k e t
A Origins of the DBR
The genesis o f the DBR can be traced in the UK in the middle o f the 19th century.21 
English law first recognised the need for regulating public issues of securities and 
its initial enactment for such regulation was the Bubble Act 1720.22 Basically, the
16 See  Public Issue Rules 1998 r7(B )(l)(i)
11 Public Issue Rule 1998 r7(B)(l )(i).
"  L C  k e o n g , S ecurities  Reg u l a tio n  in  Ma l a y s ia  110 (1997).
See  ‘Issuers, Market Intermediaries, and Secondary M arkets’ in IOSCO (1998) at 14.
10 Low, supra  note 12 at 287 fh 22, Securities Commission, Market Readiness fo r  Disclosure- 
Based Regulation  (July 2002) available at
<http://www.sc.com.my/html/whatsnew/fr_whalsnew.html (29 Nov 2002), In Malaysia, transition 
from the MBR to the DBR had been completed in March 2003: Securities C o m m issio n , Pr e ss  
Rel ea se  (31 M ar 2003)
21 LOSS, supra  note 7, at 36.
21 Knauss, supra note 8 . This source mentioned that the Bubble Act was o f  1719. But many other
sources show that it was an Act o f  1720. For example, see l b  b a sk in  & p j m iranti j r ,  a  h istory
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Act was not concerned with the regulation o f corporate disclosures. The Act which 
was repealed in 1825 imposed restrictions on the formation of joint-stock compa­
nies to combat corporate frauds, and eventually halted the growth o f joint-stock 
companies.23 Frauds in the securities market continued and a committee (Gladstone 
Committee) was appointed in 1841 to investigate the laws concerning joint-stock 
companies for the purpose o f providing greater protection to the public.24 The 
Companies Act 1844 was enacted following the report of the Gladstone Committee, 
and became the Teal beginning o f English corporations law’,25 The genesis o f  the 
modem disclosure requirements in a prospectus can be found in this Act.26 How­
ever, the contents of a prospectus were first detailed in the English Companies Act 
1867.27 To provide civil remedies against the violation o f  disclosure requirements, 
the British Parliament enacted the Directors Liability Act 1890. This legislation 
modified the common law tort o f deceits as expounded by the House o f  Lords in 
D en y  v Peek with regard to the requirements o f scienter.28 It made the directors and 
promoters o f  a company the subject of civil liabilities for untrue disclosures in a 
prospectus without the proof of scienter.29 The English Company Act 1900 further 
‘tightened’ the civil liabilities o f persons involved in a prospectus. The Company 
Act 1948 ‘established the hitherto most extensive legal disclosure requirements 
under English law’.30 However, the success o f the disclosure requirements greatly 
owed to the corresponding listing requirements o f  the London Stock Exchange 
during the first half o f the 1900s.31
Although the US followed the UK in formulating its (US) securities regulation 
regime, the US did not adopt the disclosure philosophy until 1933. Securities regu­
lation was the subject matter o f state governments exclusively till 1933. Most o f the 
state securities laws were enacted in order to follow the merit philosophy and still 
many states adhere to this philosophy in preference to the DBR.32 Following the 
unprecedented securities market crash in 1929, the US introduced securities regula­
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 111 (1997); L LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 2 (2“*
ed. 1988)
13 Knauss, supra note 8, at 611.
M Id.
25 Id.
26 LOSS, supra  note 22. For some details o f  that disclosure requirements, see  Knauss, supra note 8, 
at 611-12.
27 Knauss id at 612.
28 (1889) 14 A ppC as337 .
29 loss, supra  note 22, at 3.
30 K Pistor & C Xu, Incomplete Law: A  Conceptual and Analytical Framework and Its Application 
to the Evolution o f  F inancial Market Regulation (2002). Available on Social Science Research 
Network at <http://ssm.com>.
31 See, for details, Knauss, supra note 8, at 612.
32 L Loss, Disclosure as Preventive Enforcement, in , CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ 
LIABILITIES 327 (KLAUS J HOPT &  GUNTHER te u bn e r , eds., 1985). As o f 1978, approximately 46 
states followed the M BR in varying degrees: Brandi (1985), supra note 14, at 696. As o f  1995, 
there were a total o f  22 US slates which follow merit regulation: P D Lehmkuhl, Securities Law in 
the United States o f  America: Blue Sky Laws , in in tern atio na l  SECURITIES LAW h a n d b o o k  
245, 249 (K v  d  HEYDT & s keller , eds., 1995)
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tion at federal level for inter-state offerings and adopted the DBR by enacting the 
Securities Act 1933.33
Although the British Company Act 1844 incorporated the DBR for the first time in 
the modem history, the adoption o f  this philosophy by the US in 1933 significantly 
influenced the other nations to follow this suit. The US Supreme Court expounded 
the DBR as the substitution for the philosophy of caveat emptor for financial prod­
ucts.34 Justice Brandeis35 might be called the ‘spiritual father’ o f the Securities Act 
1933 as suggested by Loss.36 In regard to corporate disclosures, Brandeis said in 
1913 that ‘[s]unlight is said to be the best o f  disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman’. 37 However, he recognised that ‘excessive sunlight can cause 
skin cancer’.38 A different view with respect to the justification o f the adoption o f 
the DBR was evident at its very beginning in the US. Commenting on the disclo­
sure philosophy entrenched in the Securities Act 1933, Justice Douglas o f  the US 
Supreme Court in 1934, a few years before being the chairman o f the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission, opined that:
[Tjhose needing investment guidance will receive small comfort from the bal­
ance sheets, contracts, or compilation o f  other data revealed in the registration 
statement. They either lack the training or intelligence to assimilate them and 
find them useful, or are so concerned with a speculative profit as to consider 
them irrelevant.39
During the period of the 1990s, many countries have adopted this disclosure sys­
tem. For example, Asian countries had been applying the MBR for a long time.
33 Securities Act 1933 ( is the first federal securities law enacted for the regulation o f  the primary 
market. Before this enactment, the regulation o f  securities market was a  concern o f  the state gov­
ernments. These states governments mainly pursued the philosophy o f  merit-regulation under the 
respective “blue-sky laws” (US state securities laws. See, for detail, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 
M erit Regulation o f  the State Regulation o f  Securities Committee, Report on State M erit Regula­
tion o f  Securities Offerings, 41 BUS LAW 785 (1986); J F Hueni, Application o f  M erit Require­
ments in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417-1445 (1969). Still many states 
have been following the merit-regulation in US. In 1995, 22 states followed the merit regulation: 
see  Lehmkuhl id  at 249. The US system thus has a  disclosure-based foundation but substantial 
merit elements are built upon it; see J H Honea, An Empirical Study o f  Usefulness and Communi­
cative Ability o f  Segment Disclosures among Sophisticated Users o f  Corporate Financial State­
ments (1982) an unpublished Ph D dissertation submitted to the Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, UMI Dissertation Service at 28.
34 SEC v Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc 375 US 180 (1963) 186; Affiliated Ute Citizens o f  Utah 
v United States 406 US 128(1972) 151.
35 Justice Louis D Brandeis became a  Justice o f  the US Supreme Court in 1916 and retired in 1939: 
TKMCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 135 (1984).
34 LOSS supra  note 22, at 32.
37 L D BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933) It WES first
published in Harper's Weekly, 1913-1914.
31 Loss, supra note 32, at 331.
*  Id .
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Since the middle o f  the 1990s, some o f these countries started adopting the DBR 
system as espoused in Western developed markets.40
B Information to be Disclosed in a Prospectus
There have been two standards for the determination o f  the contents o f  a prospectus 
under the DBR. One is ‘non-prescriptive’ or ‘general disclosure standard’ and the 
other is ‘prescriptive’ or ‘minimum disclosure standard’. The former standard does 
not have any strictly prescribed list o f  issues concerning disclosures and it requires 
the issuer to disclose all materia! information necessary to make informed invest­
ment decisions. Hence, it is the issuer, not the regulator, who is responsible for the 
contents o f  its prospectus. Usually, developed markets follow this standard. On the 
other hand, the latter, the minimum disclosure standard, provides for a specific list 
o f information which must be embodied in a prospectus. Under such a standard, the 
securities regulator may ask for further information, if  it deems necessary. This 
standard is well favoured in emerging markets, and is followed in Bangladesh.
C Legal Requirements for Disclosures under the 
Bangladesh Law
Disclosures with respect to IPOs are regulated under the Companies Act 1994 
(CA’94) and the Securities and Exchange Commission Public Issue Rules 1998 
(PIR'98). Section 135 o f  the CA’94 prescribes the contents o f the prospectus. These 
contents were formulated for the purposes o f  the pervious merit regulation regime. 
The DBR requires greater disclosures which have been articulated in r7B of the 
P1R’98. Under r7B, the prescribed information to be embodied in the prospectus 
makes a long list. In brief, the prospectus shall contain: the basic particulars o f the 
IPO such as the amount and type o f securities being issued, offering price, commis-
The securities markets in Japan, Singapore Hong Kong are developed markets. None o f them 
adopted the DBR until recently. Japan adopted the DBR in 1997, Singapore adopted a  predomi­
nantly disclosure-based regulation in 1998 and Hong Kong undertook a four-year plan (1998-
2001) to shift from the MBR to the DBR. See, for details, Corporate Research Centre, Disclosure- 
Based Regulation, Reg io n a l  MONITOR available at:
<http J /www.hkex.com.hk/library/reports/issue31 .htm> (26 Nov 2001).
As emerging markets, India adopted the DBR in 1992 and Malaysia started moving towards the 
DBR in 1996 and could not complete the total shift from the MBR to the BDR Until March 2003. 
For details o f  Malaysian position, see  Securities Commission, Malaysia (SC), M alaysian Capital 
M arket Completes Transition to DBR with Release o f  Revised Fund-Raising Guidelines PRESS 
RELEASE (31 M ar 2003); SC, SC  Studies M arket Readiness fo r  Full Disclosure-Based Regulation, 
PRESS Re l ea se  (2 Apr 2001); SC, SC  Amends Issued Guidelines to Support Second Phase o f  
DBR, PRESS Re l ea se  (30 Dec 1999); SC, S C  Encouraged by  Positive M arket Response to Plans 
fo r  New Disclosure-Based Regulatory Framework, Pr ess Rel ea se  (8 Jul 1999); SC, Disclosure- 
Based Regulation- What D irectors Need to Know  (SC In-House Publication issued in Nov 1999); 
and SC, M arket Readiness fo r  Disclosure-Based Regulation available at;
<http/Avww.sc.com.my/html/whatsnew/ft_whatsnew.html> (29 Nov 2002).
1 24  T h e  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  L a w  R e v ie w V o lu m e  1 N o  1
sions to be given to intermediaries etc; risk factors; the use of proceeds; the descrip­
tion of business; the description o f property held by the issuer; the plan o f operation 
and the description of financial condition; the description o f  directors and officers; 
the involvement of officers and directors in certain legal proceedings; certain rela­
tionships and related transactions between the company and the directors and offi­
cers; executive compensation, options granted to the officers, directors and 
employees o f  the company; transactions with promoters; the ownership of the 
company’s securities, the determination o f  offering prices, the plan of distribution 
o f securities and their market; the description of securities outstanding or being 
offered; and financial statements.
The P1R’98 thus provides for the details o f  all material information in order to 
enable investors and their investment advisers to make informed investment deci­
sions. Apart from these, the SEC may require the disclosure of additional informa­
tion in a particular prospectus.41 In brief, it can be said that the PIR’98 covers the 
aspects o f investors’ considerations which a knowledgeable investor may wish to 
know before arriving at an investment decision. The PIR’98 actually complemented 
the CA’94 in order to meet the requirements o f  the new regime o f disclosure regula­
tion.
D Material information
There are no hard and fast rules as to which information is material with respect to 
investment in securities. In Cackett v Keswick the Court o f  Appeal in the UK held 
that, a statement will be material if  it would have an impact on a reasonable inves­
tor, or such an investor is influenced or induced in making an investment decision 
on the basis o f  the prospectus.42 Lord Halsbury LC in Arnison v Smith made a 
classic formulation of inducement by saying that:
A person reading the prospectus looks at it as a whole.... You cannot 
weigh the elements by ounces. ..if  a court sees on the face o f  the statement 
that it is o f  such a nature as would induce a person to enter into the contact, 
or would tend to induce him to do so, or that it would be part o f the in­
ducement to enter into the contact, the inference is, i f  he [or she] entered 
into the contact, that he [or she] acted on the inducement.43
In relation to the materiality o f an omitted fact, the US Supreme Court held in TSC 
Industries Inc v Northway Inc that:
It does not require proof o f  a substantial likelihood that disclosure o f  the 
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. 
What the standard does contemplate is the showing o f  a substantial likeli­
hood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have as­
41 See  for the contents and format o f  a prospectus under the DBR, Public Issue Rules 1998 r7A(2).
41 [1902] 2 Ch 456 para 2 (per Farwell J).
45 (1889)41 C h D  348, 369.
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sumed actual significance in the deliberations o f  the reasonable sharehold­
ers. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made avail­
able.44
The above judicial observations suggest that a disclosed fact should be considered 
material if  a reasonable investor considers the fact in question important in making 
an investment decision based on the prospectus. In the case o f an omitted fact, the 
materiality would be determined on a substantial likelihood that a reasonable inves­
tor would consider the matter important in deciding on the offer if  it were disclosed. 
Thus the materiality o f  information is consistent with the reasonability test.45
In Bangladesh, both the unfair disclosure as well as non-disclosure of material 
information are prohibited. However, there has been no statutory definition o f the 
term ‘materiality’ in any o f the relevant laws. In addition to the specifically required 
and additional information as alluded to earlier, the rule 7(A)(1) o f  the PIR’98 with 
regard to material information provides that:
[T]he prospectus shall contain all material information necessary to enable 
investors and their investment advisers to make an informed assessment o f 
the business engaged in, or to be engaged in, by the company, its assets 
and liabilities, its financial position, its profits and losses and its future 
prospectus and the rights attaching to the securities being offered and, in 
case o f more than one project being included in the proposed initial public 
offering, separate full disclosure for each project [emphasis added].
It is thus clear from the above discussion that a prospectus shall contain all informa­
tion in relation to both the issuer and the issue that may be o f the interest o f inves­
tors in making investment decisions.
E Full and Fair Disclosure
The primary function o f  disclosure is to eliminate the informational asymmetry 
between issuers and potential investors. With this end in view, President Roosevelt 
proposed to introduce the DBR in the United States.46 He pointed out that:
(1976) 426 US 438,448.
For the statutory meanings o f  the “concept o f  materiality" as adopted in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Swit­
zerland, United Kingdom and United States, see  t o s c o , co m pa r a tiv e  ANALYSIS OF disc lo su r e  
REGIME (1 9 9 !)  Appendix A. It is the report o f  the Technical Committee o f  the IOSCO submitted 
in September 1991.
Until the enactment o f  the Securities Act 1933, there was no central regulatory body for the 
securities market in the US. It was the states responsibility to regulate the market in pursuance o f 
the respective securities laws - the so-called blue-sky laws, o f  the state concerned (the first law o f  
this kind was enacted in Kansas in 1911, which sought to protect investors). All the state laws fol-
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O f course, Federal Government cannot and should not take any action 
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued 
securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that 
the properties which they present will earn a profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue o f  new 
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full 
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element at­
tending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule o f caveat emptor, the further doc­
trine ‘let the seller also beware’. It puts the burden o f  telling the whole 
truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities 
and thereby bring back public confidence.47
Full and fair disclosure typically refers to complete, accurate and timely disclosure 
o f the affairs o f  issuers as well as the underlying issues. An issuer o f  securities 
shall ensure that the prospectus contains all material information necessary to make 
informed investment decisions by the potential investors. This information has to be 
free from any material omission or misleading elements.
The primary thrust o f the DBR was to ensure truth in securities issuance. To 
achieve this goal, the new system imposes the burden o f  telling the whole truth 
upon the seller o f securities. However, ensuring honest and diligent performance o f 
the issuers and intermediaries in this respect is complex particularly in a country 
like Bangladesh. One o f  the most crucial objections against the disclosure regime is 
the difficulty o f  ensuring full and fair disclosure. Generally, an issuer is much more 
powerful than most investors. The issuer’s strength is measured in terms o f  profes­
sional knowledge, business techniques, and political support.48
Generally, the promoters and directors o f companies have both institutional educa­
tion and practicing experience in relation to business. In addition, each company is 
supposed to hire qualified people having expertise in law, finance, accounting and 
economics.49 In Bangladesh, the vast majority o f investors have hardly any knowl­
lowed the MBR. The above Act o f  1933 introduced the current central regulation and, at the same 
time, adopted the philosophy o f  the DBR for the fust time: Corporate Research Centre, Disclo­
sure-Based Regulation, supra note 40.
H R Rep N o 85 73rd Congress, First Session 2 (1933) quoted in CORPORATE RESEARCH CENTRE 
ibid.
For example, the former two presidents o f  the Federation o f  Bangladesh Chamber o f  Commerce 
and Industries (FBCCI), M r Salman F Rahman and Mr Abdul Awal Mintu, contested the National 
Election 2001 with the tickets from two m ajor political parties (Bangladesh Awami League and 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party) respectively. It is widely believed that the businessmen are used to 
paying considerable amounts o f  money to the fund o f  the political parties. Their financial superi­
ority over the individual investors is needless to explain.
Knowledge on these subjects is most relevant for a  public issue, and for defending the company 
for any pertinent fault.
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edge o f  investment,30 More importantly, they do not even have adequate financial 
solvency to get their portfolios managed by professionals, even if  such a service 
becomes available. Moreover, investors are not able to bring issuers to the court to 
redress the violation o f law mainly because o f financial deficiency. Therefore, from 
a practical point o f view, the issuers are superior to the general investors in terms of 
investment knowledge as well as financial ability. Perhaps the lack o f financial 
sophistication o f investors has contributed to the non-availability o f  professional 
advisory services in the Bangladesh market,’' Thus it is easy to understand why, 
although the market is half a century old, it has been seen as an ‘infant’ market.52
Generally speaking, most businesspersons in Bangladesh are involved in party 
politics directly or indirectly.33 By virtue o f  their political affiliation and financial 
strength, they might feel some sort of ‘implied immunity’ against any legal course 
o f  action (judicial or regulatory), and thereby become less honest in their prepara­
tion of the prospectus. The influence o f  their money and political alliance (or con­
tribution to parties' funds) is best evident in the unusual delays o f  15 criminal cases 
instituted by the SEC in 1997 pursuant to the inquiry report on the share scam 1996. 
In three out o f 15 o f these cases, the deputy chairman o f the Beximco Group o f 
Companies (Beximco), country’s largest industrial conglomerate,34 amongst others, 
was implicated. None o f  the above cases has yet been finally disposed o fj^  The 
Appellate Division o f the Supreme Court in Skainpukur Holding Ltd v Securities 
and Exchange Commission56 (one o f the above 15 cases) observed that:
It is true that in criminal matters the accused should get all protection un­
der the law but it is also important that the law should not be stretched too 
far so that big companies against whom serious allegation o f foul play 
concerning national economy is being made before the Court by a statutory 
authority [SEC] can themselves overtake the law by raising ingenious con­




Enq uiry  com m ittee,  enq uiry  report  o n  sh a r e  m arket 12 (1997)
In v e s to r  In fo rm atio n  C e ll ,  CSE, Mr k. u  Jalal < iic@csebd.com> email (10 Apr 2003)
M O Imam, Capita! M arket Development in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects, Portfolio  
4 3 ,4 6  (Oct-Dec 2000).
A recent research shows that a total o f  78 per cent o f  companies “give donations to political 
parties or candidates” : Corporate Funds Flow into Political Pockets: 78% Firms Pay Political 
Parties, CD P Research Reveals, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (5 Aug 2002).
Mr Salman F Rahman is the Deputy Chairman o f  Beximco Group o f  Companies, the largest 
private sector industrial conglomerate in Bangladesh having a  total o f  28 companies. This group 
had 11 companies listed with the DSE out o f  a  total o f  224 listed companies as at 30 June 2001. 
He was the president o f  the Federation o f  Bangladesh Chamber o f  Commerce and Industry 
(FBCC1), the apex body o f  the businessmen o f  the country, and the Chamber o f  South Asian As­
sociation o f  Regional Cooperation (CSAARC).
secur ities  a n d  ex c h a n g e  COMMISSION, SEC Quarterly Review (Jul -  Sep 2004), Dhaka at 19. 
18 BLD (1998) 61.
Shinepukur Holding Ltd v Securities and Exchange Commission 18 BLD (AD) (1998).
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One o f the main reasons for the delay is believed to be the financial strength and 
political connections o f  the accused. 58 More surprisingly, there are no reported 
cases in the last 20 years concerning the misstatement or concealment o f  material 
facts in prospectuses, although such statutory requirements59 have reportedly been 
violated on several occasions.60 In this way, the issuers and investors cannot be seen 
as parties o f equal status in respect o f IPOs.
It should be pointed out that to take advantage of such weakness o f investors, many 
issuers adopt unfair means in preparing prospectuses by concealing material facts 
and/or embodying false and misleading information. In support o f  this allegation, 
some eminent auditors of the country observed that ‘though financial reports is [sic] 
prepared by the management, very often auditors do not discharge their duties from 
the point o f  professional ethics’.61 The relationship between the companies and 
their auditors is so unethical that the SEC had to promulgate a new rule to combat 
professional unfairness and unethical conduct.62 In accordance with this new rule 
issued by the SEC on 26 November 2001, companies were barred from appointing 
the same audit firms consecutively for more than three years. The High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court on 20 May 2002 stayed the operation of this rule 
upon the petition from the Beximco.63 There are reports to show that such unfair 
practices are rife. In so doing, either material information has been concealed, 
and/or false and misleading information has been fiimished.64 Hence, the situation
3 For (he reasons for such delay and influential role o f  the accused, see  M S Rahman, “Justice 
Should Not be Done, but Must be Seen to be D one": Prosecution Lawyer Opposes Transfer o f  
Beximco Share Scam Cases, THE d a ily  STAR, Dhaka (5 A pr 1999); M S Rahman, Hearing o f '96 
Share Scam Cases: Defence Charged with Delaying Tactic, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (15 Mar
1999); M S Rahman, Cases on Share Scam M ove a t Snail's Pace: Hearing on Charge Framing 
Begins September 24, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (1 Sep 2000); M S Rahman, Share M arket Case: 
Lengthy Hearing on Charge Framing Goes on Innocent Acts Can be Illegal i f  Taken Together- 
Prosecution, THE d a i l y  s t a r ,  Dhaka (7 Jan 1999); M S Rahman, Share Scam Case: Proceedings 
Against 2 Directors o f  2 Firms Quashed, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (24 Jun 1999); M S Rahman, 
Share Scam: A Stormy Session at High Court, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (8 Jun 1999); H C  Judge, 
Defence Lock in Debate over “Fair H earing", THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (4 M ar 1999);, Beximco  
Case Embarrassed HC Judge, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (5 M ar 1999); 1996 Share Scam: Supreme 
Court Judgment on Merit o f  the Cases, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (31 Dec 1998); M S Rahman, 
Judges, When Transferred, Do Not Carry Their Jurisdiction Along, t h e  d a i l y  s t a r ,  Dhaka (19 
May 1999); M S Rahman, SEC, Slate Lawyers Tell Court: Transfer o f  Share Scam Case to Raise 
Questions, t h e  d a i l y  s t a r ,  Dhaka (20 May 1999); Plea to Transfer 3 Share Scam Cases Re­
jected , THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (8 Apr 1999); M S Rahman, 1996 Share M arket Scam: Charges 
Framed against Former D SE C h ie f t h e  d a i l y  s t a r ,  Dhaka (5 Apr 1999); 3 Share M arket Cases 
Referred to M SJ Court, THE INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (15 M ar 1999);, Hearing in 3 Share Scam  
Cases Resumes, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (9 M ay 2001); Share Scam: 2 Beximco Companies M ove 
Petition fo r  H C  Stay, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (4 Jun 2001); Share Scam Case: H C  Turns Down 
Petition by Beximco Cos, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (5  Jun 2001).
59 See  Companies Act 1994 si 35.
60 See  for example, infra note 64
61 D N Saha, New SEC  Law Removes M onopoly o f  Audit Firms, T h e  INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (14 Nov
2001).
42 Id
63 H C  Stays Two Notifications o f  SEC, Th e  FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dhaka (21 May 2002).
64 AIMS o f  Bangladesh Limited cancelled their commitment for underwriting the floatation o f
Modem Food Products Limited after the publication o f  the prospectus. AIMS decided on this can-
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demonstrates that many issuers are issuing defective prospectuses in collaboration 
with the other members of IPO coalitions.65 In a report by Khan, an experienced 
accountant, it was observed that, ‘most o f  the CA [Chartered Accountants] firms
cellation after detecting that the audited account o f  the company provided to them by the Mer­
chant Bankers and issue Manager o f  the issue differed from the one published on the prospectus 
and concealed material facts. The audit report on the prospectus had been qualified by the auditors 
for not complying with Bangladesh Standard o f  Accounting (BS A) 4 and 16 on fixed asset sched­
ule. It was also exposed that the sponsors o f  the issuer are bank loan defaulters. The bad loan li­
ability and litigation against them have been understated and concealed at Taka 5.205m against 
actual Tk 13.465m: see AIMS, AIM S Ditches M odem  Food, WEEKLY MARKET REVIEW (10 Jul 
2000) at 1; M S Rahman, AIM S Backs Down on Pledge to Underwrite M odem  Food: Audited Ac­
counts D ifferfrom  Prospectus Statement, Th e  DAJLY St a r , Dhaka (3 Jul 2000).
The SEC has sued the directors o f Wonderland Toys Ltd and its Issue manager (National Securi­
ties and Consultant Ltd) for allegedly “ inducing the investors into purchasing its shares by artifi­
cially showing a rosy picture o f the company” . The company went for an IPO o f Tk 50 million. In 
its prospectus, the company showed that Wonderland's counterpart in Hong Kong had provided 
them with the plant and machinery as per a  joint venture agreement and all the machinery had 
been installed. The SEC filed the case based on its inquiry reports. The SEC complaint stated that 
“[a] 11 these claims are outright false, deceptive and an illegal bid to gain by providing false infor­
mation with a view to luring investors into buying its shares". It may be mentioned here that 
W onderland failed to make any profit and pay dividends for two consecutive years. For detail, see 
M S Rahman, Court Summons Wonderland Toys Directors fo r  A lleged Deception: Fake IPO Info 
M ake Investors Buy Scrips, th e  d aily  Star , Dhaka (19 Jan 2001).
Audit firm M/s Ata Khan & Co had been accused o f  certi lying false statements by two companies 
on their balance sheets. The SEC inquiry as well as the investigation o f  the disciplinary committee 
o f  the Institute o f  Chartered Accountants o f Bangladesh (ICAB), the professional statutory body 
o f  accountants, found the firm guilty for certifying balance sheets o f  two companies showing in­
flated amounts o f  bank liability. These two green field companies' sponsors sought to raise Tk 360 
million from the IPOs. For details, see M S Rahman, Auditing Firm under SEC-ICAB Fire, THE 
DAILY STAR, Dhaka (21 Apr 1998).
FU-W ang Ceramic Industry Limited, a  Taiwanese-owned company, concealed tax evasive infor­
mation in its prospectus for an IPO to raise Tk 50 million which was revealed during the subscrip­
tion period. Such information is required to be published under the prevailing law and 
international accounting practices, which have been adopted by Bangladesh: see T  I Khalidi, IPO 
to Raise Tk 5 cr by Taiwanese Tiles Producers: Fu- Wang Conceals Information, THE DAILY 
star , Dhaka ( I I  Feb 1998).
Madina Shoe Industries Ltd submitted a  petition for IPO for the SEC’s approval. The petition en­
closed a  due diligence certificate with the forged signature o f  a  director. Later, the SEC turned 
down the application. The SEC detected the forgery when directly contacting the director, see  M S 
Rahman, SE C  Turns Down Madina Shoe’s IPO Petition: Allegation o f  Submitting False Docu­
ments, THE daily  star , Dhaka (12 Jun 2000).
The SEC suspended the IPO o f  Raspit Data Management and Telecommunications Ltd by accus­
ing the company o f  inflating its assets. An investigation conducted upon a  complaint by some 
internet services providers led to this accusation: see  M S Rahman, SEC Suspends Raspit IPO, 
Orders Special Audits: Auditor to be Selected by the Company, THE d aily  star ,  Dhaka (15 Sep
2000).
Keya Cosmetic Ltd, a reputed company, allegedly concealed the evasion o f  a huge am ount o f 
Value Added Tax (VAT) in its prospectus. The company offered IPO for TK 25 million whereas 
the alleged amount o f  evaded tax was Tk 390 million: see  M S Rahman, Alleged Tax Evasion by  
Keya: SE C  M ay A sk Co to Issue Public Notice, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (15 Jun 2001).
There are more cases supporting the adoption o f  unfair means by the issuers, intermediaries and/or 
auditors to raise f in d  for the firms from the public, but could not be mentioned due to space con­
strains.
45 For raising money from the public through unfair disclosures, see  for example, K A Mansoor,
Share Scandal: Som e Companies Looted 500 Crore Taka, THE DAILY JANAKANTHA, Dhaka (15 Jun
2002) (translated from Bengali).
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don't bother to verify the books o f  records adequate enough to make their audit 
reports true and fair’.66 This report also claims that the ‘irresponsible signing o f 
audit reports by most o f  the audit firms are discouraging the few firms that are still 
struggling to maintain auditing standard’.67 By reiterating the lack o f confidence, 
recently, the Finance Minister has advised the DSE officials to stop indulging in 
market manipulation. In response to this request, the officials highlighted the fact 
that the financial reports o f  companies lack transparency.68 Thus the submission o f 
false or misleading reports by auditors is one o f the reasons for the prevalence o f 
the lack o f proper and adequate disclosure in Bangladesh.69
In such a situation, it would be really difficult to ensure full and fair disclosure in 
prospectuses. If the information is not disclosed properly, the investors cannot make 
informed decisions even if they are able to utilise the disclosure in a prospectus. 
When the assurance of full and fair disclosure is frustrated, the whole objective of 
the disclosure regime becomes futile, because, incomplete and inaccurate informa­
tion cannot help investors make informed investment judgments. Instead, such 
disclosure can lead to deception. Since the vast majority o f  investors in Bangladesh 
are unsophisticated, they are unable to invest further, once they lose their life sav­
ings. Thus they stay away from the market. In such circumstances, the new inves­
tors cannot put their trust in the market, and as a result, the market suffers from lack 
o f  investor confidence. All of these observations ensure that it would be unrealistic 
to expect full and fair disclosure in prospectuses in the prevailing circumstances.
F Due Diligence of the Persons Involved in an IPO 
Coalition
The term ‘due diligence’ implies ‘[a] close examination, particularly in a legal 
sense, of a transaction and its related documentation’.70 In respect of disclosure, 
due diligence is a process by which inquiries are conducted to ensure that informa­
tion to be disclosed is true, sufficient and timely. Persons involved in the prepara­
tion o f a prospectus must undertake a due diligence exercise to verify and ensure 
the accuracy, completeness and timeliness o f information to be disclosed to the 
public. They should demonstrate a minimum standard o f  conduct which provides 
safeguards against the contravention of relevant regulatory provisions and adequate
K A Khan, A ud itors' Responsibility, THE d a i l y  S ta r , Dhaka (5 Jan 2002). The report further 
mentions that the auditors do not have propensity to maintain the auditing standard due to lack o f  
accountability and supervision. Most o f  the firms are engaged in unjustifiable competition to in­
crease the number o f their clients. The writer is a  well-known accountant and auditor o f  the coun- 
try.
Id.
th e  PROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (13 Feb 2002) (translated from Bengali).
Imam (2000) supra note 52, at 56. Even M r Am ir Khosni M ahmood Chowdhuty, the founder 
president o f  the Chittagong Stock Exchange and currently M inister for Commerce has described 
the condition o f  disclosure standard as “deplorable". See  A K M Chowdhury, The Capital Market 
o f  Bangladesh: Present & Future, portfolio  13.13 (Oct-Dee 2000).
P E NYGH & P BUTT (EDS), BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 393 ( 1997).
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supervision ensuring that the system is properly carried out.71 The central point of 
due diligence is that the persons involved in a transaction or a documentation must 
exercise their powers and carry out their duties with care and diligence. Their role 
must satisfy a standard that a reasonable person would exercise his or her powers 
and perform duties in the same manner under the same circumstances.
Various persons adopt unfair means in various forms. The examples o f unfair 
practices as noted earlier show that directors’ signatures are forged; intermediaries 
and auditors provide due diligence certificates by concealing material information 
or embodying untrue and false information. At times, the issuers are getting audi­
tors’ reports prepared without exercising due diligence. Subsequently, such issuers 
are submitting these imperfect reports to underwriters to convince them that they 
should enter into an underwriting agreement. After obtaining underwriting agree­
ments, the issuers publish in their prospectuses different financial statements which 
are at odds with the previous audit reports. For example, as discussed earlier, this 
happened in July 2000, when Asset & Investment Management Services (AIMS) 
withdrew its underwriting pledge with Modem Food Products Limited. Despite the 
existence o f such prohibited practices, remedial action against the auditors is sel­
dom heard o f  in Bangladesh.72 Until December 2000, the SEC has filed at least 12 
complaints against different audit firms with the Institute Chartered Accountants o f 
Bangladesh (ICAB),73 but the ICAB suspended in a single instance one of its mem­
bers for one year only.74 Recently, speakers in a seminar on the Capital Market 
Development in Bangladesh have identified unfair disclosure as one of the funda­
mental problems that the market is currently encountering.75 Disclosing the hidden 
reality o f  the audit reports, a SEC official commented that:
Audit reports and balance sheets o f  many listed companies, approved at 
their annual general meetings, were found to have been tailored to suit the 
needs of the sponsors and deprive shareholders of dividends.76
A similar comment is found in a study on investor protection. It says that ‘...audits 
o f some companies are cooked up in a tailor-made w ay’.77 Thus the fabrication of 
audit reports is a well established practice in this market.
In light o f  the above-mentioned malpractice, this analysis suggests that neither 
companies nor auditors are following legal and ethical standards in auditing com­
Universal Telecasters (Qld) Ltd v Guthrie (1978) 18 ALR 531; 32 FLR 360. See also SPCC v 
Kelly (1991)5  ACSR 607.
The SEC filed at least 12 complaints against auditors to their professional statutory body (ICAB) 
for punishment. The ICAB in one instance suspended one o f  its members for one y ea r see  M S 
Rahman, SEC  D raws the Line fo r  Auditors: Firm s Violating International Standard to be Black 
Listed, th e  daily  star , Dhaka (24 Dec 2000).
The ICAB is the statutory self-regulatory body for accounting professionals.
M S Rahman SEC D raws the Line fo r  Auditors: Firms Violating International Standard to be 
B la c k lis ted , THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (24 Dec 2000).
See Stability in Capita! M arket Sought, th e  in d epen d e n t , Dhaka (6 Oct 2000).
Rahman, supra  note 74.
M Hossain, Protecting Investors in Capital M arket, PORTFOLIO 11,13 (Oct 1999).
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panies’ accounts to a reliable extent. This is happening although the SEC has made 
it compulsory that audited balance sheets o f  listed companies must be prepared in 
compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA).78 The extent o f  unfairness concerns both the ICAB 
and the SEC. As an acknowledgment o f  the prevalence o f the malpractice o f audi­
tors, two respective regulatory agencies (the ICAB and the SEC) in a meeting 
emphasised the importance o f credibility of the auditors’ reports and audited finan­
cial statements for promoting capital market development in the country.79 This 
observation is complemented by an important study on investor protection across 
31 countries (70,000 firms between 1990-1999 examined). This study revealed that 
the quality o f  financial reports has a positive impact on the level o f  investor protec­
tion.80 The full exercise of due diligence is essential for quality financial reports; 
but in view o f the reality in Bangladesh as noted above, providing a due diligence 
certificate seems to be merely window-dressing on many occasions. Thus, from the 
investors' point o f  view, it would be another way of being deceived by being made 
to believe in such certificates. Therefore, ordinary investors are more willing to buy 
shares o f  reputed companies to avoid the risk of losing their savings. At the same 
time, they demonstrate their lack o f confidence in the companies that are not well 
known to the public regardless o f the real value of their offers.
G Improved Corporate Governance
Corporate governance denotes a system whereby a company is governed. It is 
concerned with establishing a system in which the directors o f  the company are 
entrusted with responsibilities and duties to run the entity.81 According to Sheikh, 
an effective corporate governance system attempts to devise some mechanisms to 
regulate company directors ‘to ensure that they act in the best interests o f  the com­
pany in its broad sense’ and that they refrain from ‘abusing their powers’.87 The 
systems o f this kind o f governance ‘have evolved over centuries’ in the wake of 
corporate failures.83 Investors, both individuals and institutions, make their invest­
ment decisions depending on the issuer’s outlook, its reputation as well as its gov­
ernance.84 The issue o f  corporate governance is regarded as a means of promoting 
enterprise and ensuring accountability,85 A recent empirical study conducted by the 
World Bank researchers strongly supports this view and shows that corporate gov-
See  Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 (amendments).
75 ICAB, SEC  Joint M eet Held, THE INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (13 Jul 2001). See also, Scenario o f
Capital M arket Discussed, THE INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (25 Feb 2001).
10 C Lcuz, D Nanda &  P D Wysocki, Investor Protection and Earnings M anagement: An Interna­
tional Comparison, MIT Sloan School o f  Management Working Paper No. 4225-01 at 1 available
at: <http://papers.ssm.com> (20 Dec 2001).
*' S Saleem Perspective on Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & CORPORATE
CONTROL 5 (Sheikh Saleem & William Rees, eds., 1995)
12 Ibid.
U MR ISKANDER &  N CHAMLOU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION 1
(2000).
M Id  at 2.
85 Id.
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emance and corporate performance are highly correlated.86 The study also main­
tains that companies practicing good corporate governance can provide investors 
with better protection.87 Improved corporate governance is thus an important con­
sideration for the development o f  the securities market.
The concept of good corporate governance relates to the relationship between the 
board o f directors of the company and its stakeholders.88 Although management is 
responsible for carrying out the regular/day-to-day business of the company, the 
board is entrusted with the tasks of formulating the corporate policy, recruiting the 
staff o f  the management, overseeing and evaluating the activity o f the management 
and disciplining the staff. Thus the primary authority o f the administration o f the 
company lies with the board. Basically the board exists to serve and protect the 
stakeholders. There are ‘three groups o f players’ in corporations. They are: ‘share­
holders (and employees, if  they have a governance role), boards o f directors, and 
managers’. Good governance warrants balancing the roles o f these groups.89 How­
ever the way o f accomplishing this objective is not uniform. ‘There is no single 
model of corporate governance’90 and there is an ongoing debate about what makes 
up good corporate governance.91 In May 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) formulated a set o f  principles for good gov­
ernance known as the OECD Principles o f  Corporate Governance (these principles 
were subsequently revised in 2004). These principles have gained international 
recognition as the minimum acceptable standards for companies and investors 
around the world.92 Having regard to the recent development in corporate govern­
ance worldwide as well as corporate collapse in some countries such as the USA 
and Australia, the OECD Principles 1999 have been reviewed in 2004. The revision
L F Klapper & ] Love, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerg- 
ingM arkets, World Bank working paper number 2818 at 21 (Apr 2002).
117 Id  at 21-22.
88 Stakeholders typically include: shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, and 
communities
89 ISKANDER &  CHAMLOU, supra  note 83, at 20.
90 Id  at 6.
91 W at 3.
91 In April 1998, the OECD council meeting called upon the organisation to develop a  set o f  corpo­
rate governance standards and guidelines. Following this resolution, the OECD formed the Ad- 
Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance to develop a  set o f  non-binding principles. In addition 
to its members states’ experience, the Task Force benefited from broad exposure to input from 
non-OECD countries, the World Bank, the International M onetary Fund, the business sectors, in­
vestors, trade unions, and other interested parties (see forewords o f  the Principles). The Task 
Force concluded its work in April 1999 and its submission was subsequently approved by the 
OECD and endorsed by the member nations at their annual general m eeting on 26 and 27 May 
1999 respectively. The OECD Principles are the first multilateral set o f  principles on corporate
governance. These principles were welcomed by the G7 leaders in June 1999 and are likely to
work as “signposts” for corporate governance by the United Nations, the World Bank, the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund, and other international organisations: see, for details, Statement on the 
OECD Principles, in In te r n a t io n a l  Co rpo r ate  Go v e r n a n c e  N etw ork  (ICGN), ICGN 
Sta t em e n t  o n  Glo bal  Co rpo r ate  Go v e r n a n c e  Principles available at: 
<http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm> (2 Apr 2002); Isk a n d e r  & C h a m l o u , su­
pra  note 83 , fh 9 at 28; Industry Canada, Questionnaire on the OECD Principles o f  Corporate 
Governance, available at: <http://stratcgis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/corplaw/oecd> (2 Apr 2002).
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aims at strengthening the corporate governance regime further.93 Bangladesh is far 
behind the original principles formulated by the OECD in 1999, and could not yet 
adopt a minimum standard for corporate behaviour.94 The situation is so critical that 
the World Bank (WB) has recently imposed conditions on the Government o f 
Bangladesh regarding corporate governance for receiving Financial support. Ac­
cording to the WB conditions, the government will have to, inter alia, make law to 
ensure corporate accountability to the national legislature.95 In such a reality, Bang­
ladesh should first look at the fundamentals o f corporate governance. The funda­
mental tenets o f  the OECD principles are: fairness, transparency, accountability, 
and responsibility.96 On the basis of these pillars, the OECD’s four basic principles 
can be identified as follows:
i. protection o f  shareholder rights;
ii. equitable treatment o f  shareholders;
iii. timely and accurate disclosure and transparency; and
iv. diligent exercise of the board o f  directors’ responsibilities.97
To implement the OECD principles, the above mentioned pillars are to be estab­
lished first. In fact, none of the above pillars exists in Bangladesh. Commentators 
describe poor corporate governance as one o f the fundamental problems in the 
market.98 In this regard, the situation prevailing in Bangladesh is discussed below.
H Fairness
There have been widespread allegations o f  unfairness in corporate activities. An­
nual General Meetings (AGMs) are the ultimate controller o f the affairs o f  compa­
nies, because, an AGM can elect as well as remove the management o f  a company. 
There are some reasons which inhibit shareholders’ participation in the activities o f 
companies through the AGMs. First, shareholders are deprived o f their right to 
voice their opinions in respect of the irregularities o f  the company management 
since many companies do not hold their AGMs for several years. Secondly, the 
companies holding AGMs are not fair-minded enough to allow their members to 
elect the directors and claim their dividends. This passivity of these shareholders is 
partly attributable to their own unwillingness to take part in the AGMs, and partly 
to the offering o f  gifts to them by the management. An example of the lack of
,J For details, see  OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2004.
44 See, Corporate Governance Code Vital to Cutting Corruption- Speakers Observe at BE I-Junior
Chamber Seminar, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (20 Aug 2004).
R K  Byron, Corporate Sector to be Accountable to JS, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (9 Mar 2005).
% ISKANDER & CHAMLOU supra  note 83 at 21.
41 Id. The wording o f  the principles has been borrowed from the source.
g* M A Chowdhury, Corporate Governance: Transparent Disclosure to Strengthen Investor Confi­
dence, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dhaka (26 Nov 2002); Order to Recast Z  Group Firms in Interest 
o f  Sm all Investors: SE C  Chairman Says at a  Press Conference, THE DAILY STAR* Dhaka (2  Sep
2002).
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fairness in corporate governance can be seen in the AGMs of four companies o f the 
‘Apex Group’ (an influential group of industries in Bangladesh) where there is 
usually a noticeable absence of shareholders." The members who were present 
were reportedly offered gifts either in cash or in kind from the respective manage­
ment. The gifts might be seen as a bribe to stop them from voicing their criticisms 
(opinions).100 In an interview with the Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS) in 
October 2000 the SEC chairman identified ‘gifts in AGMs’ as one o f  the major 
problems.101 The SEC had to formally resolve that no benefit in cash or kind, other 
than in the form of cash dividend or stock dividend, shall be paid to the sharehold­
ers o f  a company.102 For the enforcement o f  this directive, the SEC on 3 January 
2002 issued a rule directing the listed companies to deposit the video films of their 
AGMs to its (SEC) office. But the High Court Division suspended the operation o f 
this rule on 20 May 2002 following a writ petition of the Beximco Group referred 
to earlier,103 Hence, the true participation o f the shareholders in the election o f the 
company’s board of directors and the discussion of other aspects o f the company 
were hindered either by the lack o f  interest or knowledge of the shareholders them­
selves or malpractice pursued by the management.
The example o f  unfairness is also evident in the floatation o f companies. It is ob­
served that ‘the newly floated primary shares in the secondary market squeezed to 
less than half [of the issue price]’.104 More alarmingly, the market prices o f  shares 
of a significant number of companies had ‘fallen even to the extent o f 10 per cent of 
their face value’.105 Furthermore, Ahmed, an eminent market analyst, observed that 
shareholdings o f sponsors and directors as shown in balance sheets are false in 
many cases.106 Potential investors are induced by such false information. Ahmed in 
another study finds that only 8-10 company shares (out o f nearly 240 companies) 
are good and ‘many shares do not have any economic value’.107 This implies that 
issuers were not fair in raising funds from the public in many cases.
F Bari, Culture o f  M anaging AGMs Getting Intensified: 72 Out o f  101 Companies D id Not Pay 
Dividends, t h e  dajly in q ilab , Dhaka (14 Dec 1999) (translated from Bengali).
Ibid.
101 SEC C h ie f Sees Market Turnaround by January: Arrival o f  G ood New Issues Likely, THE DAILY 
STAR, Dhaka (7 Oct 2000).
102 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC), DHAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001, at 40 
(translated from Bengali) [hereinafter SEC (2001)].
1<U H C  Slays Two Notifications o f  SEC, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dhaka (21 May 2002).
ltM Share Prices Rise, THE NEW n a t io n , Dhaka (24 Aug 2002). There were at least five companies
the shares prices o f  which went below 20 per cent o f  the issue price: F Bari, M arket Price o f200-  
Taka Primary Shares Only 11 Taka, THE Da ily  in q ila b , Dhaka (22 Aug 2002) (translated from 
Bengali)..
105 Investment in Shares, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dhaka (1 Jul 2002).
136 A Ahmed, Volatility in Share Bazar, THE PROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (12 Nov 2001) (translated from 
Bengali).
107 See A Ahmed, What Thai Prime M inister Told, THE DAILY JUGANTOR, Dhaka (17 Jul 2002) (trans 
lated from Bengali).
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I Transparency
As argued by Mobius, transparency provides the best protection to investors against 
the malpractice of the company management especially in a situation where the 
management tries to act dishonestly.108 Transparency is a common problem in 
Bangladesh109 and the lack o f  transparency is a chronic problem in corporate cul­
ture, One o f the causes of regulatory failure in securities regulation is argued as the 
lack o f transparency in the market.110 This problem is evident in many situations. 
For example, directors o f some companies are allegedly involved in dishonest 
activities: such as misappropriation o f  subscription money; overpricing o f company 
assets; forging company shares; and procuring many false audited reports and so 
on.111 There are also allegations that company profits are not shown in the balance 
sheet so as to deprive the shareholders.112
In the wake o f  such malpractice, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court (CMMC) 
in Dhaka issued warrants o f  arrest against three directors o f Mark Bangladesh 
Shilpa and Engineering Ltd, a listed company, for their alleged involvement in 
misusing investors’ fund.113 The SEC made allegations concerning the overvalua­
tion o f company’s assets, and misappropriation or improper use o f IPO funds. The 
SEC's allegations were based on several investigations.114 Clearly, the lack o f
lt! J M Mobius, Issues in Global Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN 
ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 43-44 (L C Keong, ed., 2002).
109 The Berlin based Transparency International has placed Bangladesh at the top o f  the Corruption 
Perception Index as the most corrupt country in the world in the last consecutive four y e a rs : Most
Corrupt fo r  Fourth Time- Govt Rejects TI Report, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (21 Oct 2004). Re­
cently, the jo in t report o f  the World Bank and UNDP released on 3 June 2002 reveals that the ac­
counting process in Bangladesh is not transparent and corruption eats away 40 per cent o f  public 
funds. See WB, UNDP Report on Bangladesh: Corruption Eats 40 p c  Public Funds, THE NEW 
NATION, Dhaka (4 Jun 2002).
110 M Hossain, Getting Back Investors' Confidence, the  fina n c i a l  EXPRESS (27 May 2002).
131 The SEC lodged a First Information Report (FIR) with a. police station against three directors,
auditors and issue managers o f  the IPO after necessary investigation. The investigation reveals 
that “ ...directors injected forged allotment letters into the stock market and siphoned huge 
amounts o f  money by deceiving the general investors” . See fo r  detail, M S Rahman, Complaints 
Lodged with M otijheel Thana [Police Stationj: SEC Finds JH  Directors, 3 Firms Involved in 
Share Forgery, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (22 Dec 1999); SE C  Files FIR against J JH  directors in 
Share Forgery, t h e  FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dhaka (22 Dec 1999).
111 A Ahmed, Volatility in Share Bazar, THEPROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (12 Nov 2001) (translated from
Bengali).
113 For detail, see Warrants o f  Arrest Issued against Three M ark Bangladesh Directors, THE 
FINANCIAL EXPRESS (3 Jun 2000).
314 The accused persons were the directors o f  Mark Bangladesh Shilpa and Engineering Ltd. The 
SEC investigation reveals, amongst other things, that the “realistic value o f  the plant and machin­
ery o f  the company was 53.51 million taka while the figure was shown as Tk 504.73 million in the 
audited balance sheets... and 523.61 million taka in another report submitted to the S E C ...” . In 
addition to these, another enquiry discloses that the company has procured machinery in violation 
o f  conditions imposed by the SEC. And the activities o f  the company were also a  deviation from 
the statements made in the prospectus about utilisation o f  IPO funds as evident from the inquiry: 
see  for detail, ibid. Another listed company, Mark Bangladesh Shilpa & Engineering, one o f  the 
top 30 companies based on value o f  share capital, has had transacted its own shares with its own 
funds (o f more than Tk 20 million) as disclosed in an inquiry conducted by the Bangladesh Bank, 
central bank o f the country. Such transactions are unlawful: see  A Kibria, Injbrmation o f  the In-
2005 Primary Share Market in Bangladesh 137
transparency in corporate activities is evident and the transparency of transactions 
in the market is almost non-existent in the absence of effective legal, regulatory and 
supervisory functions.115
J Accountability
The management o f a company is accountable to its shareholders in respect of using 
corporate ‘resources in the most efficient and desirable manner’.116 The best way o f 
exercising corporate accountability to its shareholders is holding AGMs regularly. 
In a Press Release on 21 November 2001, the SEC said that shareholders o f a 
significant number o f  listed companies are not in a position to know the true state o f 
affairs o f their companies, because AGMs were not held. Legal provision in this 
regard is clear. The statutory law117 as well as the SEC directives11* require the 
companies to hold AGMs in each year, but in practice, the extent o f  not convening 
AGMs is adversely affecting the market as observed by the securities regulator.119 
The SEC also added that under the present state of affairs, very often investors 
failed to make considered judgment about investment.120 In the same release, the 
SEC acknowledged that despite repeated efforts, the commission has not received 
any tangible results in this regard.
Many listed companies have been failing to hold their AGMs for several consecu­
tive years.121 Even i f  some companies hold their meeting in time, there is evidence 
that the directors will be able to gain the favour o f the participating shareholders by 
adopting unfair means (gifts in cash or in kind) as alluded to earlier.
Getting dividends, if  declared, is an important right o f shareholders. Non-holding of 
AGMs normally affects the declaration o f dividends. Many companies do not 
declare dividends for several years and if  declared, do not deliver on tim e.122 So
quiry Report o f  Bangladesh Bank: M ark Bangladesh Has Got Its Shares Transacted with the 
Company's Funds, THE PROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (22 May 2000). See  also for the company's position 
in the DHAKA STOCK EXCHANGE (DSE), DHAKA , ANNUAL REPORT 1998 -1999 at 79.
111 Hossain, su pra  note 110.
116 Mobius, supra  note 108, at 41.
117 Companies Act 1994 s 81.
118 SEC supra  note 102.
119 SEC, Press Release (21 Nov 2001).
120 Id.
121 The SEC decided to carry out audits o f 25 listed companies which failed to hold AGMs for two or
three years consecutively: see Failure to Hold AGMs fo r  Two to Three Years: SE C  to Audit F i­
nancial Conditions o f  25 Companies, THE d a i ly  s t a r ,  Dhaka (12 Dec 1999).
122 Despite several steps taken by the SEC and the tax incentives to regularise dividends, the situation 
did not improve. During the FY1999- 2000, 79 companies out o f  192 listed companies o f  the DSE 
which held AGMs did not declare any dividends. The remaining 27 companies did not hold 
AGMs. So, a total o f  106 out o f  219 listed companies o f  the DSE did not declare dividend: see 
SEC, DHAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000 at 18-25 [hereinafter SEC (2000)]. During this year, the 
SEC received eight complaints from the investors against the companies for delayed or non- 
receipt o f  declared dividend: see above SEC (2000) at 29. A total o f  44 listed companies have not 
declared any dividend in the last five years: 44 Companies Declared No Dividend in Five Years, 
THE NEW  AGE, Dhaka (18 Jul 2004). There are some companies which do not hold AGMs
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accountability to investors is still long way off.123 According to the chairman o f the 
SEC, not more than 20 to 25 per cent o f  listed companies grant a dividend on a 
regular basis.124
The above discussion demonstrates clearly that corporate accountability has not yet 
been established in Bangladesh.
K Responsibility
The Board o f Directors has the responsibility for properly monitoring the affairs o f 
the company. The above discussions on fairness, transparency and accountability 
also refer to the lack of responsibility o f corporate management towards sharehold­
ers. From the viewpoint o f  investor protection, corporate management is charged 
with the responsibility to maximise the benefits of the company rather than to 
increase the benefits o f  the persons involved in the management. The lack o f  re­
sponsibility o f  the corporate directors towards general investors is perhaps best 
evident in two recent co-related decisions o f  the Beximco Pharma, a listed company 
belonging to Beximco. The Board o f  Directors of the company declared 10 per cent 
dividends in April 2002 along with 10 other listed companies of the group. In 
declaring the dividends, the company allegedly violated securities law for which the 
SEC suspended the trading o f  shares o f  these 11 companies.125 After the resumption 
of trading, many ordinary investors offloaded their shares in a bearish market fol­
lowing the declaration of lower dividends as compared to those o f the previous 
year. The company held its AGM in July 2002 and all o f  a sudden suspended its 
running AGM for 15 minutes and held an emergency meeting of the Board of 
Directors. The board decided to enhance the rate of dividends from 10 per cent to 
15 per cent and the decision was immediately approved in the AGM which resumed 
after the above-mentioned suspension. Commentators observed that the enhance­
ment o f dividends in such a manner deprived the general investors o f their due 
benefits since many o f them already sold their shares.126 The company management 
harmed the market in general by its former declaration o f dividends (April 2002),
even for more than five years: Failure to Hold AGMs: SEC Asks 13 Cos to Submit Accounts fo r  
Defaulting Years, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (24 Aug 2004).
123 For details in respect o f  companies failure in holding AGMs and paying dividends, see 41 Listed  
Companies Did Not Pay Any Dividends in Last Five Years: D SE Decided to Take Action, THE 
PROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (21 Nov 1999) (translated from Bengali); 60 Companies Did Not Pay Divi­
dends f o r  Four Years, t h e  DAILY ITTEFAQ, Dhaka (20 Feb 2000) (translated from Bengali); F 
Bari, Shares o f  35 Companies Defaulting Dividends fo r  Five Years are Instruments o f  Casino 
Board: Strength o f  Evil Powers, THE DAILY INQILAB, Dhaka (8 May 2000) (translated from Ben­
gali); Bari, supra  note 99.
124 See SE C  C h ie f Sees M arket Turnaround by January supra note 101.
IIS SE C  Suspends Trading o f  Shares o f  I I  Beximco Group, THE INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (1 May 2002);
Share Trading o f  I I  Beximco Companies Suspended, THE NEW NATION, Dhaka (1 May 2002).
126 SEC Serves Show Cause Notice on Beximco, THE fin a n c ia l  EXPRESS, Dhaka (9 Jul 2002).
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and its latter decision benefited the members of the board as large shareholders at 
the expense o f small investors.127
The foregoing discussion shows that the basic pillars o f  good corporate governance 
are not present in the corporate life in Bangladesh. The country does not even have 
any code for corporate governance to date.128 The SEC in 2000 emphasised the 
need for formulating the principles of corporate governance, and the necessity for 
amending the Companies Act 1994 to improve this governance.129 Nonetheless, no 
real progress has taken place so far in this regard.
The lack o f  good corporate governance is recognised by all. The SEC acknowl­
edges that investors lack proper knowledge o f investment, and the auditing prac­
tices are not conducive to maintain investor confidence in audit reports.120 The 
problem o f accountability is so acute that 10 listed companies have not been pub­
lishing their annual reports for three consecutive years, but have nevertheless 
quoted their shares on the exchanges.131 Clearly, such a serious lack o f  corporate 
governance does not support following the BDR for the IPO market as a method for 
providing investor protection.
L Adequacy of Investor Knowledge of Investment
Investors’ ability to make an intelligent investment judgment ‘is a major assump­
tion and is the cornerstone of the capitalistic economy'.132 Maintaining a similar 
view, the Technical Committee of the IOSCO has emphasised the need for investor 
education for their protection and an effective regulation o f the securities market.133 
In Bangladesh, the investment decisions o f  overwhelming majority investors are 
based on rumours instead o f  economic fundamentals o f  the issuers as revealed in a 
recent survey.134 This finding is supplementary to that o f  an important enquiry 
committee.133 Further, the SEC itself admitted on several occasions the fact that
The declaration o f  lower dividends was allegedly intended to unfairly increase the holdings o f  the 
controlling shareholders: see Trading o f  11 Companies o f  Beximco Group in Share M arket Sus­
pended, THE PROTHOM alo , Dhaka (1 M ay 2002) & Legal Steps Initiated: SEC Action Illegal- 
Says Beximco, THE NEW NATION, Dhaka (3 May 2002).
128 Corporate Governance Code Vital to Cutting Corruption - Speakers Observe at BEI-Junior 
Chamber Seminar, T h e  D a ily  S ta r ,  Dhaka (20 Aug 2004),
129 Share Bazar in the Eye o f  the SEC, THE DAILY ITTEFAQ, Dhaka (20 Feb 2000) (translated from 
Bengali).
,M Id.
131 Bari, supra note 99.
!32 Testimony o f  Denise Voigt Crawford, Texas Securities Commissioner, before the U S Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, on The Importance o f  Financial Literacy and  
Education in America, at 15, available al:
<http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/abtnasaa/view_top_stories.asp?start=0& partition= l >  (12 Feb 2002).
1,3 See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE BULLETIN, INVESTOR PROTECTION IN THE NEW ECONOMY at
11; The Role o f  Investor Education in the Effective Regulation o f  CIS and CIS Operators, report 
OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE IOSCO (March 2001) at 2-8.
134 M Rahman, “Devil”  and Future o f  Share Market, THE PROTHOM ALO, Dhaka (18 Dec 1999) 
(translated from Bengali).
133 ENQUIRY COMM ITTEE, supra  note 50, at 17.
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investors lack investment knowledge. Furthermore, international market analysts 
complement this admission of the SEC by characterising the investors as ‘inno­
cents’.136 Hence, the DBR has imposed an exclusive responsibility on these unso­
phisticated investors for assessing the merits o f  IPOs based on disclosures made by 
the companies in unfavourable circumstances.137 Accepting the inability o f inves­
tors to make a so-called informed investment decision, the SEC as well as stock 
exchanges have undertaken some programs to educate investors. However, these 
programs had no significant effect on imparting investment knowledge to the inves­
tors.138 In brief, the programs of stock exchanges are limited to holding seminars 
and discussions. Only 257 people attended the SEC Weekly Investors’ Education 
Program introduced in June 1999 until June 2000.139 The participants in this pro­
gram were 48, 111 and 105 in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively.140 It can be 
easily understood that the total number o f  participants is insignificant as compared 
to the actual number o f  ordinary investors in the market.
The information disclosed in a prospectus is related especially to the disciplines o f 
finance, accounting, law and economics. In addition, the investors must have 
knowledge o f English because the prospectuses are published in English, the second 
language in the country. Thus, there is no plausible ground to believe that these 
ordinary investors are able to understand and properly analyse the information 
embodied in the prospectus.141 It is argued that if the ‘investors are given access to 
all material information, it is up to them to decide how to use the information and to 
accept the consequences of their investment choices’.142 This argument ignores the 
fact that investment knowledge is not something to be achieved with ‘divine inspi­
ration’ and without sincere efforts.143 Moreover, securities literature is complex and 
technical and therefore not readily understood.144 In view of the above reality, it can
136 The Bangladesh Stockmarket: Slaughter o f  the Innocents, th e  eco no m ist  {7-13 D ec 1996) 90 at 
90-91; Em erging  Sto ck m a rk et: Re v e n g e  of t h e  In n o c e n ts , th e eco no m ist  (12-18 April 
1997) 74 at 74.
1:17 This is so because, all concerned including the SEC recognise that com panies do not practice good  
governance, and auditors reports are not trustworthy: Share Bazar in the Eye o f  the SEC, supra 
note 129
118 Despite numerous rigorous education programs over the last few years in the United States, Texas 
Securities Commissioner acknowledged on 6 February 1999 that “on average, the general public 
is financially illiterate” : Testimony o f  Denise Voigt Crawford, supra note 132 at 1, If  this is the 
situation in US, then the situation o f  Bangladesh can be easily understood.
'w SEC, supra note 122, at 49.
140 SEC, supra note 102, at 38, and SEC, d h a k a ,  a n n u a l  REPORT 2001-2002, at 40 (translated from 
Bengali) [hereinafter SEC (2002)], SEC, d h a k a , a n n u a l  REPORT 2002-2003, at 51.
141 Investors in the United States are not yet able to rely on themselves. “ Investor Ignorance" Invest­
ment News (6 Aug 2001) at 4. If this is the situation in United States, then how could one believe
that investors in Bangladesh are quite able to make their investment decisions prudently without
any pertinent knowledge.
141 H A 1 FORD, R P AUSTIN &  I M RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 877 (9'1' e d . 
1999).
141 Securities analysis requires prophetic knowledge without divine blessings. “Basically, the security
analyst must be a prophet without the benefit o f  divine inspiration”- B G MALKIEL, a  rando m  
WALK DOWN WALL STREET 121 (1990).
144 J H LORJE, P DODD & M H K1MPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE viii (2nd ed
1985) “ [T]he law governing [securities] manipulations has become an embarrassment- confusing,
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be said that investors in Bangladesh cannot have meaningful access to information 
furnished in the prospectus. The DBR offers no assistance to the investors. In fact it 
may, despite its good intentions, deprive the investors of benefiting from the as­
sessment of the regulator (under a merit regime), resulting in further undermining 
the protection of investors in the IPO market.
M Competent Market Professionals and Intermediaries
Apart from auditors and lawyers, professionals and intermediaries in the IPO mar­
ket include issue managers, underwriters, financial advisers and portfolio managers. 
So far, no registered financial advisers are engaged in the securities market and 
there is no practice o f  seeking investment advice in fact.145 Actually, the SEC has 
not promulgated any regulations for them to date. The reason may be the lack of 
interest from both service providers and service users.146 However, the SEC has 
granted licences to 23 companies as full-fledged merchant banks until June 2003.147 
Blaming the merchant bankers for their inactivity, the SEC chairman observed that, 
not more than four or five of them operate at a reasonable level.148 In another report 
on the continued poor performance o f listed companies on the bourses [could this 
concept be clarified], merchant banks have been termed as ‘mere spectators’ in the 
capital market just a month before the adoption o f the DBR.149 Moreover, these 
banks are not experienced and financially strong enough to function on a large 
scale. In addition, some o f them meanwhile have allegedly been involved in market 
manipulation resulting in the SEC suspending brokerage licences o f  Equity Partners 
Securities Limited, a merchant bank.150 Therefore, the extent of merchant banking 
services is not in favour of the DBR.
The position o f portfolio managers is not good either. Apart from the above mer­
chant bankers, there has been only one merchant banker which is authorised to act 
only as a portfolio manager in the market as at June 2003.151 The SEC issued li­
cences to merchant bankers who are entitled to act as portfolio managers in a down­
trend market after the market debacle 1996 with an expectation that they would 
play a significant role in salvaging the market by generating fresh funds. But in 
practice, none o f  these banks lived up to the expectation.152 Acknowledging the
contradictory, com plex, and unsophisticated” : E  T M cDermott, Defining M anipulations in Com­
modities Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze", 74  N w . U. L. REV. 202, 205 (1979).
145 INVESTOR INFORMATION CELL, supra note 5 1 .
146 T he S E C  started formulating regulations for the merchant bankers alter receiving applications 
from the potential merchant bankers.
147 SEC, DHAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 -  2003, at 7.
148 At the tim e o f  this comment, the total number o f  such banks was 25 or 26  as the SEC chairman 
mentioned. See SE C  C h ie f Sees Market Turnaround by January, supra  note 101.
149 M S Rahman, Depression in Bourses B lam ed fo r  Inertia: Merchant Banks Still Mere Spectators in 
capital Market, THE DAILY STAR, Dhaka (26 D ec 1998).
150 See  D  N Saha, SE C 's Surprise Over Canard: Trading in Bourses Not Suspended , THE 
INDEPENDENT, Dhaka (27 Aug 2001).
151 Business and management Company Ltd is the so le portfolio manager in addition to the fully- 
fledged merchant bankers: SEC, DHAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 -  2003, at 7.
112 Rahman, supra note 149.
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difficulties o f  managing portfolios, the Managing Director of Industrial Develop­
ment Leasing Company of Bangladesh (IDLC), a portfolio manager, said that ‘[w]e 
have to ensure profits before asking anyone to come and invest. And we are finding 
it a bit hard to ensure that’.153 Expressing their pessimism about the market per­
formance, market analysts maintained that the beginning of portfolio management 
by merchant banks was uncertain.154
The development o f any professional service depends on its demand and continued 
honest and efficient practice. The demand for these professionals in the Bangladesh 
share market is very negligible, because o f  the absolute dominance o f small indi­
vidual retail investors. Hence, one o f the major impediments to the development o f 
investment advisory services in Bangladesh is the non-availability of sophisticated 
investors who usually look for such professional advice.
N Availability of Retail Research on Potential Issuers
Another important consideration in relation to the introduction of the DBR is the 
availability of retail research. Retail research on potential issuers may help investors 
make informed investment judgment. They can compare the information disclosed 
in a prospectus with that which is found in private research on an issuer at the time 
o f flotation. Institutional investors usually carry out this research. Because o f the 
lack of institutional investors, there has been no retail research on the fundamentals 
and business prospects o f  potential issuers. As a result, investors have to rely exclu­
sively on the information disclosed by the issuer concerned. The paucity o f retail 
research thus leads the investing public to believe in the disclosures made in a 
prospectus regardless o f  their accuracy. In such a situation, issuers usually take 
advantage o f  the ignorance of investors by choosing their convenient time to float 
in a ‘share hungry’ market.
A study o f  Loughran and Ritter is regarded as ‘the most useful work’ on investment 
in IPOs.155 Their study concludes that IPOs are poor investments in the long run for 
investors, relative to stock in general.156 Shayne and Soderquist have identified two 
reasons for the conclusion arrived at by Loughran and Ritter. The reasons are: ‘(i) 
IPOs are made in high markets; and beyond that (ii) IPOs underperform the sea­
soned stocks available in such markets’.157 In a bullish market, IPOs are very 
demanding, and thus investors buy primary shares in higher prices. The finding is 




155 J A Shayne & L D Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market fo r  Initial Public Offerings, 48 Vand L 
Revi 965,967 (1995).
136 See  T Loughran & J R Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 Journal o f  F inance 2 3 ,46  (1995).
157 Shayne &  Soderquist, supra note 155 .
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W eig h ted  A v e ra g e  P ric e  Index  w as in tro d u c e d  in  N o v e m b e r  2001 
in  p lace  o f  th e  p re v io u s  A ll S h a re  P r ic e  Index.
It can be  seen from  the table that the noticeable inconsistency  w ith the above propo­
sition can  be  found only  in 1997 and 2002, because the  num ber o f  new  issues 
d ecreased  despite the apparent increase in the Index. T here are p lausib le  explana-
138 The number o f  new issues for 1991 -93 has been taken from: DSE, FACT BOOK 1994 44 (1994). The 
rem aining has been taken from: SEC, d h a k a , a n n u a l  r e p o r t  1993-1994 at 31; SEC, d h a k a , 
a n n u a l  REPORT 1994-1995, at 42; SEC, D haka, ANNUAL REPORT 1995-1996, at 57; SEC, d h a k a , 
a n n u a l  REPORT 1996-1997 at 52, 31 [hereinafter SEC (1997)]; SEC, Dh a k a ,  a n n u a l  REPORT 
1997-1998, al 54, 19; SEC, DHAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 1998-1999, at 78, 64; SEC (2000), supra 
no te 122, al 16-17,13; SEC, supra note 102, at 19,15 (translated from Bengali); SEC (2002), su­
pra  note 140, al 15, 21 (translated from Bengali), SEC, d h a k a , a n n u a l  r e p o r t  2002-2003, at 9, 
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tions o f such exceptions. As regards the case o f  1997, the reason is very clear. 
During the market crash in 1996, the Index jumped from 776.9 in 1995 to 3648.75 
in the first week o f November 1996. Thereafter the Index started falling drastically 
and became 2514.15 at the end o f December 1996.159 Since then the Index main­
tained a declining trend for a long time. Therefore, although the table shows that the 
Index increased in 1997, it actually decreased. Thus the number of new issues was 
also lower.
The reason for the exception in 2002 is different. As noted above, Weighted Aver­
age Price Index replaced the previous Index. The introduction of this new Index 
system artificially increased the Index points, because it does not take into account 
the performance o f  poorly performing companies. Market participants strongly 
criticised the new Index. The stock exchanges and investors alike protested it with 
an allegation that ‘SEC is damaging share markets’.160 There has been more criti­
cism o f this system. For example, pointing at the artificial improvement of the 
Index in June 2002, one commentator contended that with the introduction o f  the 
new Index, ‘the small investors’ dark days started, as the real movement o f  the 
capital market is not truly represented by the new system’.161 There are a number of 
reports that the market was performing poorly even in June 2002.162 Thus, in such a 
situation, the above-mentioned increase in the Index does not provide any accept­
able evidence for an upward trend in the market in 2002 in the true sense. Amid 
severe criticism by various market players and commentators, the SEC eventually 
withdrew that Index in December 2003.163 This time, two separate indexes were 
introduced - one for the blue chips and the other for the reaming securities, but 
again excluding those having weak fundamentals. As a result, the indexes failed to 
portray the true picture of the market. Finally in October 2004, the SEC allowed the 
bourses to reintroduce their general indexes covering all listed securities.164
It is therefore a fact in Bangladesh that issuers prefer to go public in a bullish mar­
ket. In other words, issuers usually float in a market where the investors, especially 
the individual small investors, are hungry for shares and invest in IPOs regardless 
o f their merits.165 In such a situation, investors are not able to make intelligent
159 For detail, see SEC (1997) id. at 21.
160 D N Shah, Slock Exchanges Lodge Protest against Weighted Index: SEC Damaging Share
Market, Allege Small Investors, THE in d epende nt , Dhaka (10 Dec 2001).
191 M R Bari, Beximco Vs SEC: The Case fo r  SEC Reform, THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 
Dhaka (25 Jun 2002) (editorial).
162 The Index points mentioned in the above table represents the Index o f  June 2002. For the reports 
o f  the poor performance o f  the market, see  for example, K Rahman, Capital M arket Collapse: 
M assive Decline in Share Price-Transactions and Index Decreased, THE DAILY JANAKANTHA, 
Dhaka (I Jun 2002) (translated from Bengali); Doubts Dominate Share Market, THE NEW NATION, 
Dhaka (29 Jun 2002).
163 A Kibria, Weighted Index Goes -  SEC  Sets up Consultative Committee to Recommend Measures, 
THE NEW AGE, Dhaka (10 Dec 2003).
164 I Ahmed, D SE to Re-introduce A ll Share Price Index ,the new  age, Dhaka (22 Oct 2004).
,6S Sophisticated and institutional investors usually invest in IPOs depending upon the merit o f  the
offers, but the small individual investors are not able to do that.
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investment decisions. Thus the DBR is not regarded as an effective philosophy for 
the protection o f such investors.
IV  C o n c l u s io n
The assumption of market readiness for the utilization of the DBR in Bangladesh, in 
the absence o f  a significant number o f sophisticated investors, active market profes­
sionals, good corporate governance and fair corporate disclosure, appears to be 
unrealistic. It is clearly evident from the poor performance o f  the Bangladesh secu­
rities market which unsuccessfully attempted to restore investor confidence by 
adopting the disclosure philosophy in the aftermath o f  an unprecedented share scam 
in 1996. Switching from the merit regulation to the disclosure philosophy should, it 
is submitted, rely on the market demand rather than on a regulatory dictum.
The development of a healthy market requires complex supportive institutions 
which cannot be achieved overnight. Some o f these can exist in the early stage, 
whilst ‘[ojthers will grow only as the market itself grows’.166 This assertion came 
true to the securities market in Bangladesh where all reforms aiming at bringing the 
investors back to the market went in vain. Investors are still market shy despite the 
change in regulatory philosophy and numerous government initiatives to offer 
various incentives to major market participants over the years.
The analysis in this paper adheres to the proposition that the securities laws of those 
jurisdictions which are striving to develop their markets should be more supportive 
o f  investor protection than those in the developed markets.167 Many issuers, in 
collaboration with their selected market professionals and intermediaries, are taking 
advantage of the innocence o f  investors who are basically investment illiterate. No 
substantial efforts have been made thus far to educate investors. The profession o f 
investment advisers could not grow simply because the investors are generally 
small savers who are not able to afford to pay for professional services and thus 
make their investment decisions by themselves. Institutional investors are very 
negligible and foreign portfolio investment is almost ‘nil’. The lack of corporate 
governance has but added to the inapplicability o f the DBR to the Bangladesh 
market.
Since the market is still in a stage o f  its infancy, the preferred policy would be to 
return to Merit-Based Regulation (MBR), Shifting from the merit regulation to the 
disclosure philosophy should be made gradually in response to, and depending on,
16< B Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions f o r  Strong Stock Markets: The Nontriviality o f  
Securities Law, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
C o rpor ate Go v e r n a n c e  in A s ia : a  C o m pa r a tiv e  Perspective  82  (2001)
167 B Black &  R (Craakman, A Self-Enforcing M odel o f  Corporate Law, 109 H a r v . L. Rev. 1911, 
1921 (1996)
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market readiness. Initially, a 10-Year Master Plan may be made mapping out the 
way o f such shifting.168 Over this period, all necessary reforms addressing weak­
nesses persisting in the IPO market should be accomplished as early as possible and 
it should not take more than five years. The remaining five years should be spent in 
carrying out studies on the market development towards market readiness before 
making a complete departure from the paternalistic regulation to the disclosure 
philosophy. A wholesale importation o f the disclosure philosophy from the devel­
oped markets without attaining the pre-requisites for its usefulness by an underde­
veloped market is an arrangement like ‘putting the cart before the horse’.
In this respect, the Capital M arket M aster Plan 2001 o f  Malaysia may be taken into account. The 
text o f  th is plan is available at: <http://www.sc.com.my/html/cmp/CHAPTERLPDF> (10 May
2003).
